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~" In the Supreme Court 
~~Q of the State of Utah 
1 
-; 
SLIM OLSON, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
KEITH WINEGAR, doing business 
as INTERMOUNTAIN OIL DIS-
TRIBUTORS, 
Defenda;nt and Appella;nt. 
No. 7801 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF F:ACTS 
On June 6, 1951, plaintiff filed suit to recover $3,-
778.43 with legal interest, also attorney fees, on an ac-
count for goods sold and services rendered to defendant 
between January 1 and May 18, 1951. On March 24, 1951, 
prior to the filing of this action, defendant brought action 
against plaintiff for damages for destruction of a Diesel 
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engine as a result of negligent installation of a sump 
bag, (No. 4293 in the same court, which case is now be-
fore this I-Ionorable Court on appeal, No. 7780). In said 
other m1se which is now No. 7780 in this Court, plaintiff 
herein as defendant in that action, filed an answer on 
April 9, 1951, but no counterclaim. 
In the answer filed by defendant in the above en-
titled cause, the defendant admitted all except $17.12 of 
the account asserted by plaintiff as justly due and owing. 
Defendant denied liability for counsel fees. As a further 
defense, defendant alleged that civil case No. 4293 was an 
action arising out of the services performed for this de-
fendant by plaintiff; and that plaintiff herein was barred 
from asserting any claim as to matters in controversy 
in said other case by virtue of the provisions of Rule 13, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by failure to assert such 
claims by way of counterclaim. 
Exhibit "A" offered in evidence by plaintiff in this 
case, consists of a number of sales slips and delivery 
tickets, which includes one dated January 24, 1951, for 
the following items: 
Lubrication ------------------------------------------------------$ 3.00 · 
Gear grease 4 pints --------------------------------------- 1.00 
Lubefiner ---------------------------------------------------------- 5.00 
Sump bag -------------------------------------------------------- .90 
Sump gasket ---------------------------------------------------- .50 
Labor on filters .............................. -............................................................ .50 
Tax -------------------------------------------------------------------- .16 
Total ----------------------------- · $11 06 
... -........................... -------------- . 
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Thus, one of the items of the alleged account in this 
action, was a claim dated January 24, 1951, for servicing 
of a Diesel engine and the installation of a smnp bag. 
Said iten1 of account is definitely related to the cause of 
action asserted by defendant in the negligence action in 
which defendant herein sued for destruction of his Diesel 
engine. Said negligence action is now on appeal in this 
Court as case No. 7780. 
The trial court overruled in toto the objection of this 
defendant, that this action was barred as to matters 
which should have been asserted by way of counterclaim 
in the negligence action. The court affirmatively held 
that action was not barred, and in effect gave judgment 
against defendant for the service and installation per-
formed January 24, 1951, which was the subject of con-
troversy in the other action. Judgment was.allowed with-
out proof of correct service or satisfactory installation. 
The matters in controversy on this appeal are princi-
pally questions of law. 
POINTS ON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIES FOR 
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT 
1. The trial court erred in awarding counsel fees. 
2. The court erred in allowing recovery with res-
pect to items in the account which should have been as-
serted as a counterclaim in another action. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point No.1: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COUNSEL 
FEES. 
The plaintiff sued on an open account for goods sold 
and for services rendered. The award of counsel fees 
was based on a statement printed on the lower power of 
the sales slips (Exhibit "A") : 
"Received from SLIM OLSON, INC., the 
above described merchandise. The undersigned 
agrees to pay all costs, including reasonable at-
torney's fees, if this account is referred to an at-
torney for collection." 
An examination of the sales slips or delivery tickets 
(Exhibit "A"), discloses that a number of them were 
signed by persons other than defendant. The signatures 
were placed above the foregoing statement. The defend-
ant denied by answer that any of these people were au-
thorized to agree to pay counsel fees. There was no evi-
dence of any authorization. 
As far as the individual tickets were concerned, even 
if the signatures had been made below the statement, 
there could not be implied any promise to pay except 
by the individual who signed. The statement is that "the 
undersigned agrees to pay." They were not signed in the 
name of defendant, except in several instances, and as far 
as the record is concerned, those particular tickets might 
well have been covered by the advances or ·payments 
made by defendant. 
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If such a clause inserted at the bott01n of a sales 
ticket or delivery slip can be construed as a covenant 
by the principal to pay counsel fees, then every truck 
driver whose authority and employment is limited to re-
ceiving and delivering goods, can exercise the same au-
thority as an executive vice-president or general manager 
of the c01npany making the purchase, without the consent 
of the c01npany. The authority to pick up goods or freight 
which is given to a truck driver, should not be construed 
to authorize the employee to execute an agreement for 
payment of counsel fees, which would be binding upon 
the principal although not done in the name of the princi-
pal 
None of the tickets are signed below the questioned 
statement as "Keith Winegar," or "Intermountain Oil 
Distributors, By X------------------------·" If the defendant can 
be held liable for counsel fees, then even if the goods were 
picked up by messenger or other independent contractor, 
the purchaser of the goods could be held liable for attor-
ney fees. 
We have found no authority which would support 
the judginent for counsel fees in a case of this kind, in-
dependent of statute. We contend that the award of 
counsel fees was entirely in error. 
Point No.2: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING RECOVERY 
WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS IN THE ACCOUNT WHICH 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASSERTED AS A COUNTERCLAIM 
IN ANOTHER ACTION. 
,7 
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By Finding of Fact No.6 the trial court found that: 
"this account and the cause of action did not. arise 
out of the transaction alleged in ~hat cer:taln ac-
tion entitled 'I{eith Winegar, do1ng b"?s1ness as 
Intermountain Oil Distributors v. Shm Olson, 
Inc., a corporation, Defendant,'. being Civil N?. 
4293 but the court finds that sa1d cause and this caus~ were consolidated for trial, * * * And the 
court finds that the plaintiff is not barred under 
the provisions of Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure or at all from proceeding in this 
cause." 
There can be no dispute about the fact that included 
in this action was a claim for $11.06 for lubrication, in-
stallation of sump bag, etc., on January 24, 1951. Said 
Civil Case No. 4293 (now pending in this Court as No. 
7780) was brought by defendant herein against the plain-
tiff herein on March 24, 1951, to recover damages for the 
negligent installation of a sump bag as a result of which 
installation the Diesel engine was starved of oil and the 
engine was completely destroyed. On April 9, 1951, plain-
tiff herein as the defendant in said action, filed an an-
swer to the complaint. It denied liability, but did not file 
any counterclaim fo:r: recovery of the costs of installation 
or the materials and oils and greases involved in con-
nection therewith. Our contention is that with respect 
to all matters which could be classified as "compulsory 
counterclaims," action was barred here by failure to set 
up such items by way of counterclaim. 
Rule 13 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
reads as follows: 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a: 
.. 
. -. 
.-•::· 
---. 
.. (a) COnlPULSORY COUNTERCLAil\L 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any clairu 
which at the ti1ne of serving the pleading the 
pleader has against any opposing party, if it 
arises out of the transaction o1· occurrence that is 
the s1tbject matter of the opposing party's claim 
and does not require for its adjudication the pres-
ence of third parties of whom the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need 
not be stated if at the time the action was com-
menced the claim was the subject of another 
pending action." (Italics added.) 
Federal Rule 13(a) is identical with our Utah Rule 
13(a). It is to be noted that the rule states: 
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving the plead-
ing the pleader has against any opposing party, 
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence 
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's 
claim." (Italics added.) 
In support of defendant's contention in this matter 
it is necessary to interpret the meaning of the phrase 
"transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of 
the opposing party's claim." 
30: 
As stated in Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 3, P. 
"An all-embracing definition cannot be given, 
nor is one desirable. The same flexibility and 
same empirical treatment is necessary in connec-
tion with 'transaction or occurrence' that has been 
advocated and discussed in connection with 'cause 
of action.' " 
Moore then quotes from the case of Moore v. New 
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York Cotton Exchange (1926), 270 U. S. 593; 46 S. Ct 
367; 70 L. Ed. 750, as follows: 
"'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. 
It may comprehend a series of man?J occu:rences, 
depending not so much upon t.he tm_medwten_ess 
of their connection as upon thetr logtca_l relf!rtwn-
ship. The refusal to furnish the quotations Is one 
of the links in the chain which constitutes the 
transaction upon which appellant here basis its 
cause of action. It is an important part of the 
transaction constituting the subject-matter of the 
counterclaim. It is the one circumstance without 
which neither party would have found it neces-
sary to seek relief. Essential facts alleged by ap-
pellant enter into and constitute in part the cause 
of action set forth in the counterclaim. That they 
are not precisely indentical, or that the counter-
claim embraces additional allegations; as, for ex-
ample, that appellant is unlawfully getting the 
quotations, does not matter. To hold otherwise 
would be to rob this branch of the rule (the com-
pulsory counterclaim provisions of Equity Rule 
30) of all serviceable meaning, since the facts 
relied upon by the plaintiff rarely, if ever, are, in 
all particulars, the same as those constituting the 
defendant's counterclaim." 
The case of Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Musante-
Phillips, Inc., (1941) 42 Fed. Sup. 340, also supports 
the contention of appellant. In this case the plaintiffs 
sue to recover freight and other charges upon a carload 
of lettuce from Oxnard, California, by various diversions 
to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where the consignee re-
jected. The defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that 
the carload of lettuce was diverted so negligently by vari-
10 
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.:. 
ous connecting carriers that the lettuce arrived in a 
da.Inaged condition. The Court held that Rule 13(a) was 
mandatory, and if the defendant had not pleaded its 
counterclaiin it would have been precluded by raising 
the same matter in an independent action. 
Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, et al. 
(1947) 159 Fed. Sup. (2d) 349. This was an action 
against the United States for earned freight. Counter-
claims for damage, demurrage and expenses alleged to 
unworthiness of the vessel were held to be compulsory 
counterclaims which must be pleaded under Rule 13(a). 
In Advance Thresher Co. v. Klein 133, N. W. 51, ac-
tion was brought on a series of notes given for the pur-
chase price of a threshing rig. The notes were given to 
secure the purchase price which was set ou~ in a contract 
of sale. The defendant counterclaimed for medical ex-
penses and loss of services occasioned defendant by in-
juries to his minor son while assisting the plaintiff's 
agent in repairing the rig, which repair was being made 
pursuant to the contract between plaintiff and defend-
ant. The Court, in interpreting the meaning of the · 
word "transaction," quotes the case of Story v. Story, 
100 Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 671, as follows : 
"In the case of Story v. Story & Isham Com-
mercial Co., 100 Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 671, the court 
held that the 'transaction' comprehended within 
the meaning of this section of the Code is not 
limited to the facts set forth in the complaint, but 
includes the entire series of a.cts and mutual con-
duct of the parties in the business or proceeding 
11 
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between them which formed the bas~s of the. agree-
ment, and if plaintiff omits or fatls t~ set forth 
in his complaint the entire transactwn out of 
which the claim arose defendant may supplement 
this omission by setting forth in his ans~er the 
omitted facts, so that the entir~ t:ansactwn: may 
be before the court. The plainttff t~ no~ at hberty 
to select an isolated act or fact, whwh ts only one 
of a series of acts or steps in the entire transac-
tion, and insist on a judgment on that fact alone, 
if the fact is so co1vnected with others that it forms 
only a portion of the transaction." See also 34 
Cyc. 686 and 687. 
The Court then goes on and discusses the threshing 
rig case: 
"In the case at bar, the notes set out in the 
complaint constitute but a component part or por-
tion of the entire transaction of the sale of the 
threshing machinery by plaintiff to defendant. 
The contract of sale with all its mutual agree-
ments and provisions, the acts of all the parties 
and their agents performed under and by virtue 
thereof in carrying out and performing the mu-
tual provisions thereof, the repair of the engine, 
the assistance to be furnished in such repair on 
the part of defendant, are all parts of one and the 
same transaction, just as much as the giving or 
the payment or nonpayment of the notes sued 
upon. The question then arises, Was the alleged 
negligent injury to the defendant's son so con-
nected with the transaction or subject-matter of 
the action as to constitute a proper counterclaim~" 
The court held that it was. 
These cases make a very realistic and broad inter-
pretation of the word "transaction." The Moore case 
12 
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cited above is authority under Federal Rule 13(a), since 
Rule 13(a) is broader in scope than Equity Rule 30 under 
which the Moore case was decided. Equity Rule 30 re-
quired a counterclaim "arising out of the transaction 
which is the subject-matter of the suit." Rule 13(a) re-
quires a counterclaim arisii_1g "out of ·the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-n1atter of the suit." 
In 3 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 33, appears the 
statement: 
"Courts should give the phrase 'transaction 
or occurrence that is the subject matter' of the suit 
a broad realistic interpretation in the interest of 
avoiding multiplicity of ·suits. Subject to the ex-
ceptions, any claim that is logically related to 
another claim that is being sued on is properly 
the basis for a compulsory counterclaim; only 
claims that are unrelated to or are related, but 
within the exceptions, need not be pleaded. * * *" 
The note to Rule 13(a) states that "Sees 104-9-1 (2) 
and 104-9-3, are covered by this rule. Section 104-9-3, 
U. C. A. 1943, provided: 
"If the defendant omits to set up a counter-
claim in the cases mentioned in the first subdivi-
sion of the next preceding section, neither he nor 
his assignee can afterwards maintain an action 
against the plaintiff therefor." 
The rules do not expressly state the language of the 
foregoing former statutory provision, but by implication 
they bar action on matters which would be compulsory 
counterclaims, by subdivision (e) of Rule 13 : 
13 
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"When a pleader fails to set up a counter-
claim through oversight, inadvert_ence, or excus ... 
able neglect or when justice requnes, he may by 
leave of co~rt set up the counterclaim by amend-
ment." 
. There is a fundamental reason why a defendant 
should be compelled to assert as a counterclaim any mat-
ters which arise out of the transaction which is the sub-
ject-matter of the claim of plaintiff. The instant case 
help to illustrate the necessity for such a rule to prevent 
a miscarriage of justice. If a defendant who is sued for 
negligently performing a service in such a manner that 
it resulted in damage to plaintiff, denies that he ren-
dered such service in his attempt to defeat the negligence 
action, he should not be permitted in a subsequent action 
to recover for the very service which he denied that he 
ever rendered. 
In the instant case, plaintiff who was the defendant 
In the negligence action, by answer filed April 9, 1951, 
admitted that the truck was serviced on January 24,1951, 
but denied that the corporation did or was in any manner 
responsible for the things of which Keith Winegar com-
plained. No counterclaim was set up for recovery of the 
amount claimed for service to the truck which was the 
basis of the negligence claim of Keith Winegar. Nor was 
any counterclaim set up for any services rendered to the 
plaintiff in that action (defendant in the instant case). 
However, on June 6, 1951, Slim Olson, Inc., filed an inde-
pendent action to recover on open account, which in-
cluded the transaction of January 24, 1951, with respect 
to the very Diesel engine in controversy. 
14 
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If plaintiff had counterclaimed in the negligence 
action for the clain1 of January 24, 1951, for service and 
installation on the Diesel engine, as we contend plaintiff 
was required to do under the cmnpulsory counterclaim 
rule, plaintiff would have been compelled to prove that 
it perforn1ed the service in a good workmanlike manner. 
By filing an independent action and including therein 
the claim which related to the controversy with respect 
to January 24, 1951, along with other claims, plaintiff 
sought to be compensated in this action for service on 
the Diesel engine on the theory that it was done properly. 
There was no evidence that the service and installation 
was properly done. 
Even if the question of attorney fees were not in-
volved in this action, defendant here would have been 
compelled to appeal in this case, by reason of the inclu-
sion in this case, the controversial claim which is the 
subject of the negligence action; for even if defendant 
here as the plaintiff in the negligence action prevails 
in this Court, upon the re-trial of said cause, the plaintiff 
here as defendant in that action would doubtless attempt 
to plead the judgment in this case as a bar to recovery. 
Plaintiff would doubtless claim that recovery was had in 
this case for installation, and that by implication, judg-
ment in this case covering the service and installati~n 
was for proper installation and negatived negligent in-
stallation. 
Defendant has been compelled to take two appeals, 
due in part to the failure of the trial court to exclude 
from this case, matters which were part of the "tran-
15 
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saction or occurrence" which constituted the subject 
matter of the negligence action. Plaintiff should not be 
permitted to say that although covered by the com-
pulsory counterclaim rule, it should be excepted there-
from because it chose to combine its claiin which should 
have been asserted as a counterclaim, with other claims 
which were independent of the controversy over the 
Diesel engine. The evil of allowing any such an excep-
tion is that it allows a party to have more than "his 
day in court," and subjects the injured party to two 
appeals involving the identical controversy. 
The streamlining of our Rules of Civil Procedure 
will operate to short-circuit justice, if the term "Com-
pulsory Counterclaim" can be construed to mean "Op-
tional Counterclaim." If such construction of Rule 13 
were permitted, it would permit a defendant to deny lia-
bility in an action for services negligently performed, 
and then allow recovery in a subsequent action for the 
very service with respect to which he denied liability, 
and perhaps previously denied that he ever rendered. 
When the evidence disclosed that the account for 
January 24, 1951, was included in this action, the court 
should have treated that matter as barred by failure 
to set up such claim as a counterclaim in the negligence 
case. Counsel for defendant here argued at the trial 
that items in the account were barred in addition to the 
ones of January 24, 1951. Even if defendant were wrong 
in claiming additional items or even all of the items 
were barred, that error could not obviate the prejudicial 
error of the trial court in holding that none of the items 
16 
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~ were barred. The ihnns relating to the servicing of the 
- Diesel engine on January :2-1, 1951, were definitely claiins 
which arose "out of the transaction or occurrence that 
is the subject Inatter of the opposing party's claim" in 
the negligence action. 
The court declared that both cases were consolidated 
for trial. The consolidation was without notice; but dis-
.. regarding such fact, consolidation of two cases for trial 
_ did not operate to make the complaint in the instant 
case or any portion thereof, a counterclaim in the negli-
gence action. Furthermore, the two cases were not 
merged, but remained separate and independent cases. 
- With respect to claims which are barred by reason of 
-~4 failure to assert them as compulsory counterclaims, 
there could be nothing to consolidate for purposes of 
-- trial. 
.: 
->~ 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error by award-
ing counsel fees in an action on open account, partie-
ularly in view of the lack of authority of the truck drivers 
to make any agree1nents for defendant to pay counsel 
fees. 
The trial court also committed prejudicial error in 
_ .. - holding that this action is not barred under Rule 13. 
Such ruling was reversible error with respect to the 
-.- items pertaining to the servicing of the Diesel engine on 
January 24, 1951. There was no proof that plaintiff had 
17 
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perforrned that service and installation in a cmnpetent 
and prudent manner. Regardless of how s1nall the 
amount involved might be, inclusion in the judgment of 
said amount is prejudicial, particularly if plaintiff as 
defendant in the negligence action can plead recovery in 
this action as a bar to the claim of negligence in the 
event of re-trial in the negligence case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, :McMILLAN 
& RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
18 
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